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I. INTRODUCTION 
As Iraqi tanks rolled over Kuwait in August 1990 and Arab 
and United States (U.S.) troops prepared for combat with Iraq,l 
the specter of chemical and biological warfare hovered above the 
desert sands. Developing countries, particularly in the Middle East, 
are investing heavily in the acquisition of nonconventional weapons, 
• Jessica Eve Stern is an adjunct fellow at the Center for Science and International 
Affairs at Harvard University and a doctoral candidate at the john F. Kennedy School of 
Government. She is completing a dissertation on chemical warfare in the Middle East. Marie 
Isabelle Cpevrier is an instructor in public policy and a doctoral candidate at the john F. 
Kennedy School ot Government, Harvard University. She is completing a dissertation o~ the 
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for Science and 'International Affairs CBW Working Group, Seth Carus, Paul Doty, Elisa 
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I Friedman, The Iraqi Invasion, N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1990, at I, col. 4; Kifner, Arabs Vote 
to Send Troops to Help Saudis, N.Y. Times, Aug. II, 1990, § I, at I, col. 6. 
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especially, but not exclusively, chemical weapons (CW).2 Although 
the U.S.-Soviet executive agreement mutually to reduce stockpiles 
to 5000 agent-tons by the year 20023 has diminished the threat of 
chemical warfare substantially in the U.S.-Soviet context, this agree-
ment in no way reduces the threat of chemical warfare in the 
developing world. In developing countries, for reasons described 
herein, cw are more likely to be used and their effects may be more 
deadly. 
2 Chemical weapons are non-living substances that may be used to cause death or 
incapacitation in humans or animals. Biological weapons are living organisms, most commonly 
self-replicating microorganisms such as bacteria and viruses, deliberately disseminated to 
cause death or disease in humans, animals or plants. UNITED NATIONS, CHEMICAL AND 
BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) WEAPONS AND THE EFFECTS OF THEIR POSSIBLE USE, U.N. 
Rep. No. E. 69, L 24, at 5 (1970). Unlike cw, which produce their toxic effects directly, 
biological agents affect other living matter by multiplying in their target host. Id. Toxins are 
either poisons produced by living organisms, or synthetically produced analogues of naturally 
occurring substances that cause death or incapacitation in humans, animals or plants. See id. 
at 5-6. 
In the text of the Chemical Weapons Convention currently being negotiated in Geneva, 
"chemical weapons" applies to toxic chemicals and munitions designed for their dissemina-
tion, either together or separately. The negotiators have not yet agreed to a definition of 
"toxic chemicals." A proposed definition is, "chemicals ... whose toxic properties can be 
utilized to cause death or temporary or permanent harm, to man or animals .... " United 
Nations Conference on Disarmament CD/952, at 22-23. 
Two points are worth noting about the definition. The first is that the chemical agent 
itself and the means of dissemination are both defined as cw, either together or separately. 
See id. The second point of interest is that intent is an essential part of the definition: 
"Chemical weapons" applies to "toxic chemicals ... except such chemicals intended for 
purposes not prohibited by the Convention as long as the types and quantities involved are 
consistent with such purposes." Id. at 21. "Purposes not prohibited by the Convention" means 
"industrial, agricultural, research, medical or other peaceful purposes, domestic law enforce-
ment purposes; and military purposes not connected with the use of chemical weapons" (i.e., 
for research and development associated with chemical defense). Id. at 22-23. 
For a discussion of the spread of nonconventional weapons in the Middle East, see 
generally Carus, Chemical Weapons in the Middle East, POLICY Focus, Dec. 1988; S. CARUS, 
THE GENIE UNLEASHED: IRAQ'S CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION (1989). 
3 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics-United States: Agreement on Destruction and Non-Pro-
duction of Chemical Weapons and on Measures to Facilitate the Multilateral Convention on Banning 
Chemical Weapons 29 LL.M. 932 (1990). 
"Agent-tons" refers to the weight of the chemical agent alone, not including the weight 
of munitions or containers. Estimates of the size of the Soviet stockpile vary-from 50,000 
agent-tons (the Soviets' own claim, with which the Central Intelligence Agency now concurs)-
to greater than 700,000 tons. The Defense Intelligence Agency estimates that the Soviet 
stockpile contains 75,000 agent-tons; State Department and Army estimates are considerably 
higher, as are those of other Western governments. See, e.g., Smith, Estimate of Soviet Arms Is 
Cut: U.S. Revises Figure on Chemical Weapons, Wash. Post, Nov. 9, 1989, at A 7. The smallest 
of these figures suggests that the Soviet stockpile is approximately 60% larger than that of 
the U.S., which is estimated to be 30,000 to 31,000 agent-tons. See, e.g., U.S. Chemical Weapons 
Production: Poisoning the Atmosphere, 18 THE DEFENSE MONITOR 4,7 (No.3, 1989). 
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The international community has wrestled with the problem of 
chemical and biological weapons (cbw) throughout this century. 
Two international treaties have resulted: the Geneva Protocol,4 
which prohibits the use of cbw,5 and the Biological Weapons Con-
vention,6 which outlaws the development, possession, and transfer 
of biological and toxin weapons. In spite of these treaties, the threat 
of chemical or biological warfare persists. 
The V.S. has a number of alternatives, including both legal 
and military measures, to mitigate the likelihood that cbw will be 
used against V.S. troops or those of its allies. The most compre-
hensive legal option to reduce the threat of chemical warfare is to 
adopt the Chemical Weapons Convention currently being negoti-
ated at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. This Conven-
tion would ban production, stockpiling, and transnational transfer 
of chemical warfare agents. 7 The V.S. Congress is considering other 
legal options, including legislation that would expand the list of 
chemical and biological substances controlled for export. 8 The 
Third Vnited Nations Review Conference of the Biological Weap-
ons Convention, to be held in 1991,9 will provide a forum for the 
4 The Geneva Protocol, June 17, 1925,26 U.S.T. 571, T.I.A.S. No. 8061, 94 L.N.T.S. 
65. 
5 Many countries reserve the right to retaliate with cwo See infra notes 61-62, and 
accompanying text. 
6 The Biological Weapons Convention, Apr. 10, 1972,26 U.S.T. 583, T.I.A.S. No. 8062, 
1015 U.N.T.S. 163. 
7 The Geneva Protocol, on the other hand, refers only to use of cw, not production or 
export. 26 U.S.T. 571, T.I.A.S. No. 8061, 94 L.N.T.S. 65. 
Members of the Conference on Disarmament [CD] include the 5 nuclear-weapons-
States, as well as representatives of the Neutral and Non-Aligned States, Western 
countries, and Socialist countries. Members of the Conference on Disarmament are: 
Group of 21: Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Myanmar (Burma), Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, 
India, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka, 
Sweden, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire; Group of Western countries: Australia, Bel-
gium, Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, 
United Kingdom, United States; Group of Socialist countries: Bulgaria, Czechoslo-
vakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Soviet 
Union. China is a member of the CD but does not belong to any of the three political 
groups. 
See T. BERNAUER, THE PROJECTED CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION: A GUIDE TO THE NE-
GOTIATIONS 5 n.4 (1990). 
B Two competing bills before the U.S. Congress would augment the Export Adminis-
tration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405 (1982), to control export of precursors to cbw. 
The Senate bill, S. 195, passed unanimously in May 1990. S. 195, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1989). The House passed a similar bill, H.R. 3033, in November 1989. H.R. 3033, 101st 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). 
9 Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons 
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parties to the Convention to increase confidence in the treaty. 10 This 
Conference may strengthen declarations of permitted activities to 
which parties agreed at the Second Review Conference of the Bio-
logical Weapons Convention in 1986. 11 It may also begin the process 
that would lead to a verification protocol to the Convention. 
This article presents the historical events that led to the cbw 
arms control agreements adopted in the past and examines the 
shortcomings of ~he existing arms control regime. In particular, it 
discusses the proliferation of cbw in the developing world, Iraq's 
use of chemical agents in the lran~Iraq War, and whether cw will 
be used again in the Middle East. Finally, it proposes methods for 
decreasing the likelihood that cbw will be used in future wars. These 
methods include the adoption of a global and verifiable ban on cw 
and toxins, a verification protocol for the Biological Weapons Con-
vention alld the imposition of stricter export controls on precursors 
to cbw. Because no treaty yet exists governing the possession of cw 
and because it is more likely that cw will be used in future conflicts 
than biological weapons (bw), a greater emphasis is put on the 
control of cwo . 
II. CBW ARMS CONTROL TREATIES 
International efforts to prohibit the use and possession of 
chemical, biological and toxin weapons have a long history. Prior to 
the adve·nt of modern science, these weapons were not distinguished 
from one another. They were all grouped under the category of 
poisons.l~ 
A. The Hague Convention 
At the Hagl1e Convention of 1899, nations agreed "to abstain 
from the use of projectiles the object of which is the diffusion of 
asphyxiating or deleteri!Jus gases."13 The U.S. declined to sign this 
treaty, because, in Secretary of State Hay's words: 
and on Their Destruction, FINAL DOCUMENT, art. XII (reprinted in STOCKHOLM INTERNA-
TIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE (SrPRI) CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE STUDIES, 
No. 10: STRENGTHENING THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION BY CONFIDENCE-BUILDING 
MEASURES A~nexe 2 (E: Geissler ed. 1990)) [hereinafter Second Rev. Conf.). 
10 26 U.S.T. 583, T.I.A.S. No. 8062, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163, art. XII. 
II Second Rev. Conf., supra note 9, at art. V. 
12 See generally Moon, Laws of War in Relation to the Use of Poisoned Weapons (un-
published manuscript on file at the Boston College Third World Law Journal office). 
13 The Hague Convention of 1899,26 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 2) 998, 187 C.T.S. 
459 (1899). 
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The expediency of restraining the inventive genius of our peo-
ple in the direction of devising means of defense is by no means 
clear, and considering the temptations to which men and nations 
may be exposed in a time of conflict, it is doubtful if an inter-
national agreement to this end would prove effective .... 14 
49 
Secretary Hay's suspicions about the effectiveness of the Hague 
agreement were prescient. During World War I, Germany initiated 
the use of poison gas by dispersing chlorine clouds over the Allied 
defenses at Ypres, Belgium, in the spring of 1915, not from the 
prohibited projectiles, but from cylinders. Later in the War, both 
alliances employed gas projectiles. 15 
B. The Geneva Protocol 
Following the extensive use of cw in World War I, the inter-
national community sought to prevent the use of such weapons in 
future conflicts. In May 1925, under the auspices of the League of 
Nations, the Conference for the Supervision of the International 
Trade in Arms and Ammunition and in Implements of War con-
sidered provisions prohibiting international trade in poisonous or 
asphyxiating gases and materials used for bacteriological warfare.16 
Poland recommended that any proposal to ban trade' in cw also 
include materials for bacteriological warfareY . 
Prohibiting trade in poisonous chemicals and bacteriological 
materials without first rejecting their manufacture or use proved to 
be contentious. Merely banning the export of these weapons would 
not halt their manufacture in countries already capable of so doing. 
Countries that did not possess the means to manufacture chemical 
or bacteriological arms would thus be at a distinct disadvantage. 
The ensuing debate about the merits of a treaty that asymmetrically 
14 Cited in Col. A. Waitt GAS WARFARE 12 (1942) (Chemical Warfare Service, U.S. Army). 
15 The first strict violations of the Hague Convention were the German use of T-shells, 
in January 1915, against the Russians, and the French use of tear grenades against the 
Germans at about the same time. Because neither weapon produced any noticeable tactical 
advantage (it is not even clear whether the victims noticed the attacks), neither side protested. 
A. PRENTISS, CHEMICALS IN WAR 689 (1937). "After the cloud-gas attack of April 22, 1915, 
however, Germany was generally considered by the Allies to have violated the spirit if not 
the letter of the Hague Convention, and from that date legal restraints on any variety of gas 
warfare were ignored." [d. Livens projectors (a type of artillery designed to disseminate cw), 
grenades, artillery shells and mortars were all used. 
16 4 STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE: THE PROBLEM OF CHEMICAL 
AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE 59 (1971) [hereinafter 4 SIPRlj. 
17 Second Meeting of the Gen~ral Committee of the Conference, League of Nations (1925) (cited 
in 4 SIPRI, supra note 16, at 161). 
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affected those countries that did not possess cw, with almost no 
impact on those that did, was strikingly similar to the negotiations 
on the nuclear non-proliferation treaty,18 as well as to the discussion 
about controlling the export of precursors to cw going on today. 
Ultimately, the Conference drafted and adopted the "Protocol 
for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous 
or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare."19 Com-
monly known as the Geneva Protocol, the agreement states that "the 
use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all 
analogous liquids, materials or devices, has been justly condemned 
by the general opinion of the civilised world .... "20 The Protocol 
goes on to establish that the prohibition of the use of cw in war 
"shall be universally accepted as a part of International Law."21 The 
Protocol extends the prohibition "to the use of bacteriological meth-
ods of warfare."22 The inclusion of the prohibition as part of inter-
national law is significant in that international law would bind even 
those states that are not parties to the treaty.23 
The negotiations that led to the signing of the Geneva Protocol 
were only the beginning of the U.S. association with the Protocol. 
The U.S. was an active participant in the negotiations. The U.S. 
Senate, however, failed to ratify the treaty for fifty years, because a 
powerful combination of business and military interests-the U.S. 
chemical industry and the U.S. Army Chemical Warfare Service-
successfully lobbied the Senate in the 1920's to prevent its ratifica-
tion. The U.S. eventually ratified the Protocol in 1975, along with 
the Biological Weapons Convention.24 
During World War II, the major belligerents did not use cw 
against each other. 25 During the confrontations in World War II, 
however, Italy and Japan both used cw against an unprotected foe 
in the Third World-Italy against Ethiopia and Japan against 
China.26 Following the war, the international community once again 
discussed cbw disarmament through the forum of the United Na-
65. 
18 See 4 SIPRI, supra note 16, at 61-64. 
19 The Geneva Protocol,June 17, 1925,26 U.S.T. 571, T.I.A.S. No. 8061, 94 L.N.T.S. 
20 26 U.S.T. at 575, T.I.A.S. No. 8061, 94 L.N.T.S. at 67. 
21 [d. 
22 [d. 
23 N. SIMS, THE DIPLOMACY OF BIOLOGICAL DISARMAMENT: VICISSITUDES OF A TREATY 
IN FORCE, 1975-8540 (1988). 
24 See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text. 
25 A. ROBERTS & R. GUELFF, DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 138 (2d ed. 1989). 
26 [d. 
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tions. United Nations General Assembly resolutions in January and 
December 1946 called for disarmament of atomic and other weap-
ons of mass destruction.27 In 1948, the United Nations Commission 
for Conventional Armaments included cbw in its definition of 
"weapons of mass destruction."28 
C. The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 
Until 1968, international negotiations of controls on bw were 
linked to those on the control of cwo During that year, in the Eigh-
teen Nation Disarmament Committee of the United Nations 
(ENDC), a member of the British Delegation suggested that the 
committee consider an international agreement to ban the posses-
sion ofbw separate from a ban on CW. 29 The British suggestion may 
have had practical as well as political motivations. For several years, 
beginning in 1964, Cambodia and the Soviet Union had accused 
the U.S. of violating the Geneva Protocol in the war in Vietnam.3o 
The charges concerned the U.S. use of defoliants and riot control 
agents.3! The U.S. argued that the Protocol did not prohibit its use 
of "non-toxic" riot control agents and defoliants.32 Knowing the 
gravity of the issues at stake in Indo-China, the British represen-
tative undoubtedly saw the severing of bw from cw as a way to make 
progress in the disarmament arena while the chemical controversy 
was debated elsewhere. The United Kingdom followed up its rec-
ommendation by submitting a working paper on microbiological 
warfare in August of 1968. Following discussions of the paper in 
the ENDC, the United Kingdom submitted a draft convention on 
bw at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in 1969.33 
Meanwhile, newly-elected U.S. President Richard Nixon or-
dered the National Security Council to conduct an extensive review 
of U.S. policy on cbw. Although details of the review remain clas-
sified, Nixon took an unprecedented action on November 25, 1969 
when he announced the following policy on bw: 
27 U.N. G.A. Res. 1 (I) (1946) and U.N. G.A. Res. 41 (I) (1946). 
28 See 4 SIPRI, supra note 16, at 194-95. 
29 U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT 569-
71 (1968). 
30 4 SIPRI, supra note 16, at 234-37. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT 324-
26 (1969). 
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-The United States shall renounce the use of lethal biological 
agents and weapons, and all other methods of biological war-
fare. 
-The United States will confine its biological research to de-
fensive measures such as immunization and safety measures. 
-The Department of Defense has been asked to make recom-
mendations as to the disposal of existing stocks of bacteriological 
weapons.34 
Only by renouncing the use and possession of these weapons could 
the U.S. have any hope of sincerely convincing the rest of the 
international community that the weapons were a military alba-
trosS.35 Through this policy, the U.S. unilaterally renounced the use 
and relinquished the possession of bw, presumably for all time. 36 
The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Pro-
duction and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin 
Weapons and on Their Destruction, commonly known as the Bio-
34 Statement on Chemical and Biological Defense Policies and Programs, 31 PUB. PAPERS 
OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: RICHARD NIXON 1969968 (1971). 
35 President Nixon had several policy options. He could have renounced first use of bw 
and cw only. He could have renounced first use and suspension of the production and/or 
modernization of bw stockpiles, while retaining possession of a quantity of bw as a deterrent 
or retaliatory capacity, or even as a bargaining chip to be given up in later arms negotiations. 
He could have destroyed existing stocks and suspended production, while leaving the future 
production of bw an open question should their military utility improve. He chose to re-
nounce any use of bw, destroy existing stocks and convert existing production facilities to 
peaceful purposes. One of the primary reasons the Nixon Administration renounced bw was 
their limited military utility. For a discussion of factors bearing on the development of 
President Nixon's policy, see Meselson, Behind the Nixon Policy for Chemical and Biological 
Warfare, BULL. OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, Jan. 1970, at 23-24. Limited military utility, 
however, is not a sufficient explanation for this action. If military utility was the only force 
driving the decision, anyone of the less radical policy alternatives could have been chosen. 
It was unnecessary to renounce the possession of bw for all time. The military utility of bw, 
after all, could change. 
International criticism of the U.S. use of non-lethal chemicals in Vietnam may have been 
another factor behind President Nixon's policy. See Harris, The Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention, in SUPERPOWER ARMS CONTROL 193 (1987). Yet, this explanation does not help 
to explain why the Nixon Administration's policies treated cw and bw differently. Nor does 
this explanation satisfactorily account for the bw policy. 
One (perhaps the only) plausible explanation for President Nixon's initiative is that he 
concluded that the U.S. is better off without bw than with them. As long as the U.S. chose 
to possess bw, it conferred a legitimacy to the possession of these weapons. A U.S. bw stockpile, 
moreover, would have contributed to the perception that the possession of such weapons was 
desirable, which in turn might contribute to the long-term proliferation of bw. See id. at 203. 
Other nations would reason that the U.S. chose to possess bw because the weapons held 
some value-as a deterrent, or for retaliatory, battlefield or covert use. 
36 See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, prepared for House 
of Representatives, Committee of Foreign Affairs, 98th CONG., 20 SESS., BINARY WEAPONS: 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE U.S. CHEMICAL STOCKPILE MODERNIZATION FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS 1 
(1984) [hereinafter BINARY WEAPONS]. 
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logical Weapons Convention, was concluded in 1972.37 It prohibits 
the development, production, stockpiling, transfer and acquisition 
of biological and toxin weapons.38 The Biological Weapons Conven-
tion goes beyond the Geneva Protocol in order "to exclude com-
pletely the possibility of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins 
being used as weapons .... "39 It is the only treaty in existence that 
outlaws an entire category of weapons.40 Furthermore, parties to 
the treaty agreed to destroy existing stocks of weapons, making it a 
true disarmament treaty. The Biological Weapons Convention, how-
ever, does not contain any significant procedures to verify compli-
ance with its provisions. 
D. Ratification of the Geneva Protocol and the Biological Weapons 
Convention 
Although President Nixon submitted both the Geneva Protocol 
and the Biological Weapons Convention to the Senate for confir-
mation shortly after signing the Biological Weapons Convention in 
1972, the two treaties were not ratified until 1975.4l The major 
reasons that ratification was delayed were to discuss the scope of 
the Geneva Protocol and to determine whether non-lethal chemi-
cals, used by the U.S. in the war in Vietnam, were covered under 
its provisions.42 
A secondary concern existed about whether the Geneva Pro-
tocol would prohibit the use of tear gas and other riot control agents 
in domestic police actions.43 The Protocol clearly did not affect the 
use of chemicals in domestic police actions in that the treaty only 
prohibited their "use in war."44 The broad interpretation of the 
Protocol45 was that it outlawed the use of both lethal and non-lethal 
chemicals in its language "asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases."46 
37 26 U.S.T. 583, T.l.A.S. No. 8062, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163. 
38 Id. 
39 26 U.S.T. at 586, T.I.A.S. No. 8062, 1015 U.N.T.S. at 166. 
40 The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (lNF) treaty outlawed an entire category of 
delivery vehicles, but it did not outlaw the weapons per se. 27 l.L.M. 84 (1988). 
41 See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text. 
42 See Prohibition of Chemical and Biological Weapons: Hearing Before the Comm. on Foreign 
Relations, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 26-29 (1974) [hereinafter Hearing]. 
43 !d. at 26-28. 
44 26 U.S.T. 571, T.l.A.S. No. 8061, 94 L.N.T.S. 65. 
45 For a discussion of the different interpretations of the Protocol, see 4 SIPRI, supra 
note 16, at 273, 283-86. 
46 Id. (emphasis added). 
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A narrower interpretation,47 which the Ford administration sup-
ported at the time of the hearings, was based on the negotiating 
history of the Geneva Protocol and the earlier treaties dealing with 
CW.48 
There was very little testimony during the ratification hearings 
concerning the Biological Weapons Convention. Dr. Fred Ikle, then 
director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, testified 
that ratification of the treaty was in the interest of the U.S. in spite 
of the weak verification provisions.49 He stated that the limited 
military utility and moral repugnance of the weapons contributed 
to his position.50 He also argued that compliance with the treaty 
would discourage proliferation of bw.51 There were no objections 
to the Biological Weapons Convention's ratification in the Defense 
Department, in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or in any 
other branch of government. The Senate ratified it unanimously on 
December 16, 1974, and the treaty entered into force the following 
March. 52 
E. The Review Conferences of the Biological Weapons Convention 
In March 1980, five years after the implementation of the 
Biological Weapons Convention, the First Conference to review the 
treaty's operation was held in Geneva, Switzerland. 53 Two note-
worthy events marked this First Review Conference. First, the Swed-
ish delegation led an unsuccessful effort to add verification provi-
sions to the treaty by amending Articles V and VI of the 
Convention. 54 Second, because of an anthrax outbreak in the Soviet 
city of Sverdlovsk, the U.S. State Department declared its suspicion 
that the Soviets were not in compliance with the Biological Weapons 
Convention. 55 
As Americans had long suspected a facility in Sverdlovsk to be 
a biological warfare laboratory, intelligence analysts in the West 
47 See 4 SIPRI, supra note 16, at 273, 283-86. 
48 Hearing, supra note 42. 
49 [d. at 15-16. 
50 [d. at 15. 
51 !d. at 15-16. 
52 26 D.S.T. 583, T.I.A.S. No. 8062, 1015 D.N.T.S. 163. 
53 For a detailed account of the preparations for and workings of the First Review 
Conference, see N. SIMS, supra note 23, at 93-193. 
54 [d. at 168-93. 
55 [d. at 155-59. 
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began to wonder if a leak or explosion at the facility caused the 
outbreak, even though anthrax is endemic to Sverdlovsk. In the 
midst of the Review Conference, these suspicions of Soviet violations 
of the Biological Weapons Convention were aired publicly. 56 
Whether the events at Sverdlovsk constituted a violation of the 
Biological Weapons Convention has never been officially resolved. 
This unresolved dispute revealed the verification weaknesses of the 
Convention. 57 
In contrast to the First Review, no attempt was made to amend 
the Convention at the Second Review Conference held in Septem-
ber 1986. Nevertheless, the parties to the treaty agreed to a number 
of measures at the Second Review Conference, embodied in the 
Final Declaration, that serve the purposes of verification. 58 Article 
IX of the Biological Weapons Convention binds the Parties of that 
Convention to continue negotiations towards a Chemical Weapons 
Convention that would outlaw not only the use of chemical agents 
in war (prohibited under the existing arms control regime by the 
Geneva Protocol),59 but also their production, stockpiling, or trans-
fer to other parties. A Chemical Weapons Convention, however, is 
still not a reality nearly twenty years after the signing of the Bio-
logical Weapons Convention. 
56 See id. at 226-49; see also Wade, Death at Sverdlovsk: A Critical Diagnosis, SCIENCE, Sept. 
26, 1980, at 1501. For a detailed study of the compliance issues surrounding the occurrence 
at Sverdlovsk, see Harris, Sverdlovsk and Yellow Rain: Two Cases of Soviet Noncompliance?, 
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Spring 1987, at 41. For more recent developments in the contro-
versy, see Meselson, The Biological Weapons Convention and the Sverdlovsk Anthrax Outbreak of 
1979, J. FED'N AM. SCIENTISTS, Sept. 1988, at 1. 
57 Robinson, East-West Fencing at Geneva, NATURE, Apr. 3, 1980, at 393. 
58 The delegates to the Conference recognized the deficiencies of Article V's consultation 
and cooperation process in resolving compliance questions. This recognition led them to 
adopt a provision that any party may call a consultative meeting. See Second Rev. Conf., 
supra note 9, at art. V. The delegates also agreed to an exchange of information on biological 
research, which is permitted under the treaty, and other activities that the treaty allows for 
"prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes." [d. Countries agreed to exchange 
information on: 
[the] name, location, scope and general description of activities, on research centres 
and laboratories that meet very high national or international safety standards 
established for handling, for permitted purposes, biological materials that pose a 
high individual or community risk, or specialize in permitted biological activities 
directly related to the Convention. 
Id. Finally, the parties agreed to exchange information on the outbreak of diseases that might 
raise suspicions regarding compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention. [d. 
59 Thirty-five countries adopted the Geneva Protocol (26 U.S.T. 571, T.I.A.S. No. 8061, 
94 L.N.T.S. 65) with reservations, restricting the ban to first use of cwo Full texts of the 
reservations are contained in D. SCHINDLER & J. TOMAN, THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLiCTS, 
(3d ed. 1988). 
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III. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE EXISTING ARMS CONTROL REGIME 
Shortcomings of the existing legal order governing cbw have 
become increasingly and painfully apparent. No international law 
prohibited Germany and other nations from assisting Egypt, Iran, 
Iraq, Libya and Syria with cw production.60 The Geneva Protocol 
addresses only use of cw; it does not address production, stockpiling 
or transfer of chemical weapons or technologies. Moreover, the 
Geneva Protocol provides neither for verification of compliance nor 
for sanctions in the case of abrogation. Many nations reserved the 
right to retaliate with weapons prohibited by the Protocol if another 
country, whether a signatory to the Protocol or not, uses the weap-
ons first. 61 These reservations dilute the force of the treaty. The 
Netherlands and the U.S., however, restrict their reservations to cw 
only. Both countries bind themselves not to use bw under any 
circumstances, even if bw are used against them.62 Iraq's use of cw 
against Iranian troops and against Iraqi Kurds confirmed the need 
to strengthen international law to ban all use of cbw in war and to 
prohibit transfer of cbw technology.63 
60 Gordon, C.I.A. Sees a Developing World With Developed Arms, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1989, 
at A3, col. 5; see Thatcher & Aeppel, The Trail to Samarra: Poison on the Wind: The New Threat 
of Chemical and Biological Weapons, Christian Science Monitor, Dec. 13, 1988, at Bl, col. 3 (few 
legal restrictions exist on export of equipment useful for making cw). 
61 Iraq signed the Geneva Protocol with the following reservation: 
On condition that the Iraq Government shall be bound by the provisions of the 
Protocol only towards those States which have both signed and ratified it or have 
acceded thereto, and that they shall not be bound by the Protocol towards any State 
at enmity with them whose armed forces or the forces of whose allies, do not respect 
the disposition of the Protocol. 
U.N. DEPARTMENT FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS, STATUS OF MULTILATERAL ARMS REGULATIONS 
AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS 9 n.17 (3d ed. 1987). Iraq defended its use of cw in the 
Iran-Iraq War by accusing Iran of having used cw first. "Iraq Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz 
... confirms once again his country's use of cw against Iran 'from time to time,' but states 
that Iran had used it first, 'from the very beginning' of the war." CHEMICAL WEAPONS 
CONVENTION BULLETIN, Autumn 1988, at 6. 
62 The Netherlands made the distinction between cw and bw in 1930; the U.S. did so 
when it ratified the Protocol in 1975. D. SHINDLER & J. TOMAN, supra note 59, at 120-21. 
The Netherlands' reservation reads: "Subject to the reservation that this Protocol as regards 
the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and of all analogous liquids, materials 
or devices, shall cease ipso facto to be binding on the Royal Government of the Netherlands 
in regard to any enemy state whose armed forces or whose allies fail to respect the prohibitions 
laid down in this Protocol." Id. at 124. The U.S. reservation is similar: "The Protocol shall 
cease to be binding on the government of the United States with respect to the use in war 
of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials, or devices, in 
regard to an enemy state if such state or any of its allies fails to respect the prohibitions laid 
down in the Protocol." Id. at 126. 
63 See Winds of Death: Iraq's Use of Poison Gas Against Its Kurdish Population (a Report of 
the Physicians for Human Rights), Feb. 1989, at 4, II, 13 & Appendix D. 
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Finally, the weak provisions in the Biological Weapons Conven-
tion to resolve issues of noncompliance do not allow for the inves-
tigation of suspicious activities that fall short of use. The Secretary-
General of the United Nations has the authority to investigate the 
possible use of cbw under United Nations General Assembly Res-
0lutions.64 There is, however, no authority to investigate violations 
of the Biological Weapons Convention such as development, pos-
session or transfer of bw that do not involve use. The absence of a 
verification regime in the Biological Weapons Convention, more-
over, makes it difficult for parties to the treaty to be confident that 
other nations are complying with its provisions. 
IV. CBW IN THE THIRD WORLD 
Every confirmed use of cw since World War I has occurred in 
the developing world. These include the use of cw by Italy in 
Ethiopia during 1935-36, by Japan in China during 1937-45, by 
Egypt in Yemen during 1963-67, by Iraq in Iran during 1983-88 
and by Iraq in Kurdistan during 1987-88.65 There have, moreover, 
been unproven allegations of the use of biological and toxin weap-
ons in the Third World. North Korea and China accused the U.S. 
of using "germ warfare" during the Korean War.66 More recently, 
the U.S. accused Vietnam and the Soviet Union of using toxin 
weapons, the notorious "Yellow Rain," against the Cambodians and 
Laotians in Southeast Asia.67 
A. CBW Proliferation in the Third World Nations 
U.S. government statements about the number of states in the 
developing world that possess cw are ambiguous, and even contra-
64 See U.N. G.A. Res. 37/980(1982),39/65 E(1984) & 42/37 C(1987). 
65 R. McELROY, BRIEFING BOOK ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS 5-6 (1989); A. ROBERTS & R. 
GUELFF, supra note 25 at 138; Winds of Death: Iraq's Use of Poison Gas Against Its Kurdish 
Population, supra note 63, at 37-38. Seven United Nations missions documented evidence of 
the Iraqi use of cw in the Iran-Iraq War. United Nations reports include U.N. Doc. S115834, 
June 2, 1983; U.N. Doc. S116433, Mar. 26, 1984; U.N. Doc. S/17911, Mar. 12, 1986; U.N. 
Doc. S118852, May 18, 1987; U.N. Doc. S119823, Apr. 25,1988; U.N. Doc. S/20063,July 25, 
1988, and U.N. Doc. S/20134, Aug. 19, 1988. 
66 1 SIPRI: THE PROBLEM OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, I: THE RISE OF CB 
WEAPONS 224-25 (1971). 
67 See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, SPECIAL REP. 98, CHEMICAL WARFARE IN 
SOUTHEAST ASIA AND AFGHANISTAN, (Report to the Congress from Secretary of State Alex-
ander M. Haig,Jr., Mar. 22,1982); UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, SPECIAL REP. 104, 
CHEMICAL WARFARE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND AFGHANISTAN: AN UPDATE, (Report from Sec-
retary of State George P. Shultz, Nov. 1982). 
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dictory. Iraq has admitted to possessing CW,68 and United Nations 
teams confirmed Iraq's use of cw in the Iran-Iraq War on several 
occasions. 69 According to Elisa Harris, Senior Analyst at the Brook-
ings Institution, eleven additional developing countries are "prob-
able" cw states.70 These countries do not admit to possessing cw, but 
U.S. governmental officials have issued statements on the record 
that these nations are developing, producing or stockpiling CW. 7l 
These "probable" cw-possessing states include: Burma, China, 
Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Israel, Libya, North Korea, Syria, Taiwan, 
and Vietnam.72 Harris categorizes an additional eleven states as 
"possible" possessors of cw-that is, states that have been reported 
by Western government officials, usually off the record, as seeking 
to acquire chemical agents, or as suspected of possessing CW.73 Most 
unclassified information about the spread of cbw in the developing 
world pertains to the Middle East. 
The spread of bw into the Third World also may be growing. 
In May 1988, a U.S. Defense Department witness testifying before 
Congress stated that between 1972 and 1988 the number of coun-
tries "having or suspected of having" offensive bw programs rose 
from four to ten. 74 Some of those countries were said to be in the 
Middle East,75 such as Iraq, which is allegedly doing research on 
bw. 76 More recently, Admiral C.A.H. Trost of the U.S. Navy testified 
that the number of countries suspected of developing bw had risen 
to fifteen.77 While the U.S. may "suspect" a country of having an 
offensive bw program with very little evidence, at a minimum there 
exists the perception that the proliferation of bw is increasing. 
68 See CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION BULLETIN, Autumn 1988, at 6. 
69 See supra note 65. 
70 See Harris, Chemical Weapons Proliferation, in ApSEN STRATEGY GROUP, NEW THREATS: 
RESPONDING TO THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND DELIVERY CAPABILITIES IN 
THE THIRD WORLD 67-87 (1990) (excellent discussion of proliferation). 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 71. Harris lists the following States as possible possessors of cw: Angola, 
Argentina, Cuba, India, Indonesia, Laos, Pakistan, Somalia, South Africa, South Korea, and 
Thailand. An additional eleven states Harris claims are "doubtful" possessors of cw-states 
that have been accused of possessing cw by adversaries, including: Afghanistan, Chad, Chile, 
EI Salvador, Guatemala, Jordan, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, Philippines and Sudan. Id. 
I. 
74 Cushman, U.S. Cites Increase in Biological Arms, N.Y. Times, May 4, 1988, at A9, col. 
75 Id. 
76 Engelberg, Iraq Said to Study Biological Arms, N. Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1989, at A 7, col. I. 
77 Statement by Admiral C.A.H. Trost, U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, before 
the House Armed Services Committee on the Posture and Fiscal Year 1991 Budget of the 
United States Navy 5, Feb. 20, 1990. 
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B. Will Chemical Weapons Be Used Again in the Middle East? 
1. Possible Use by Nations 
There is not a single instance in history in which an aggressor 
initiated the use of cw into a conflict against a victim who was well 
protected or was capable of retaliating in kind. 78 Although the 
capability to respond in kind appears to have strong deterrent 
effects, it is not clear how closely matched the opposing forces must 
be. Chemical weapons may be an attractive option for non-nuclear 
powers because of asymmetries in defense and in-kind retaliatory 
capabilities and because of the cost-effectiveness of chemical agents 
used against unprotected troops or civilian targets. 79 
The size of chemical stockpiles, the sophistication of chemical-
defense training, the technical characteristics of chemical protective 
gear and the availability of collective protection vary greatly among 
Middle East nations. These factors are sufficiently disparate to give 
several of these nations reason to believe that they might be able to 
use chemical agents to their advantage.8o The mounting tensions in 
78 This is true for the battle of Ypres in World War I; the Japanese chemical attacks 
against the Chinese and the Italian use of gas against the Abyssians in World War II; the 
Egyptian use of chemical agents in Yemen in 1967; and finally, the Iraqi use of cw against 
the Iranian pasdaran and against the Kurds in the 1980's Iran-Iraq War. Although the Allied 
soldiers, during World War I, learned fairly quickly that a handkerchief soaked with urine 
was better protection against chlorine than nothing at all, this does not constitute "well 
protected." As World War I continued, the Allies acquired gas masks and procured the 
means with which to retaliate in kind. 
79 It is against insurgents that chemical agents may prove themselves most useful. Iraq's 
use of mustard (and possibly Tabun) against the Kurds, and the Soviet use of chloropicrin 
in Georgia may be harbingers of future events. 
80 Six Middle East countries are believed to possess cw or have cw production capacity. 
The best equipped appear to be Israel (especially in defense); Iraq (soon to be capable of 
indigenous manufacture); and Syria (rumored to possess cw warheads for missiles). A detailed 
discussion of the potential for chemical warfare in the Middle East is contained in J. Stern, 
Chemical Weapons Threat and the Middle East: United States Policy Alternatives, (Center 
for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, 1989). Middle East cw capabilities 
are as follows: 
-Egypt: Egypt produced and used mustard and other lethal gases in its war with Yemen, 
and completed research and designs for production of nerve agents before 1973. Cordesman, 
The Middle East and Weapons of Mass Destruction 4 (Oct. 25, 1988) (Office of Senator John 
McCain) (copy on file at the Boston College Third World Law Journal office); Carus, Chemical 
Weapons in the Middle East, POLICY Focus, Dec. 1988, 1, 2-3 [hereinafter Carus, Chemical 
Weapons]. 
-Iran: Reports in the press indicate that Iran has a stockpile of mustard and that Iran's 
nerve agent production capacity is nearing completion. Detailed listing of press reports in 
Stern, supra, at 48-53. See also Carus, supra, at 3. 
-Iraq: Iraq has a large manufacturing capacity for nerve agents, mustard and cyanide. It 
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the region, the burgeoning cw industries and the ever-escalating 
influx of conventional weapons do not bode well.S ) 
Several lessons of the Iran-Iraq War inform our discussion. 
First, Iraq and Iran appear to have been sufficiently impressed by 
the results of chemical warfare that both nations are pursuing the 
manufacture of these weapons with enhanced vigor, despite the 
cease-fire and international efforts to keep precursors to these 
weapons out of the Gulf.82 Second, foreign policy objectives stifled 
much of the West's response to Iraq's repeated abrogation of the 
Protocol. 83 Any nation considering use of cw would probably take 
made extensive use of chemical agents in the Iran-Iraq War. Iraq is believed to have the 
largest stockpile of chemical agents in the region, and may soon acquire an indigenous 
manufacturing capability for nerve agents. S. CARUS, THE GENIE UNLEASHED: IRAQ'S CHEM-
ICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION 7-11,19,22,26-28 (1989). 
-Israel: Anthony Cordesman states that Israel has a plant for manufacturing nerve agents 
and has done significant research into offensive and defensive cwo Cordesman, supra, at 5. 
Israel excels at chemical defense. Fairhall, Israeli Defences Against Arab Gas Attacks, Manchester 
Guardian Weekly, Mar.12, 1989, at 11; Chartrand, Israelis Devise Plastic Suit as Shield Against 
Iraqi Gas, N.Y. Times, Aug. 28, 1990, at A14, col. 1; Brinkley, Israel Will Provide Gas Masks 
and Gear for All Its Residents, N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1990, at A13, col. 6. 
-Libya: William Webster, the Director of the CIA, called Libya's cw factory "maybe the 
single largest chemical warfare agent plant in the Third World." Norman, CiA Details Chemical 
Weapons Spread, SCIENCE, Feb. 17, 1988, at 888. U.S. government officials indicated that a 
fire on March 14, 1990, may have extensively damaged the plant's capacity for production. 
Later reports, however, indicated that the fire may have been a hoax. Gordon, U.S. Says 
Evidence Points to Hoax in Fire at Libyan Chemical Plant, N.Y. Times, June 19, 1990, at 8, col. 
3. Libya may have used chemical agents or highly toxic CS (an irritant) in its war with Chad. 
Cordesman, supra, at 4. 
-Syria: According to William Webster, Syria began producing cw in the mid-1980's. Norman, 
supra, at 888. Anthony Cordesman states that Syria has a facility for producing nerve agent. 
Cordesman, supra, at 6. Israeli intelligence officials claim to have hard evidence that Syria 
has attached chemical warheads to Scud missiles. Fairhall, supra. 
81 See, e.g., R. Shuey, W. Lenhart, R. Snyder, W. Donnely, J. Mielke & J. Motell, Missile 
Proliferation: Survey of Emerging Missile Forces, Oct. 3, 1988 (Congressional Research 
Report for Congress) [hereinafter R. Shuey]; Carus, NATO, Israel and the Tactical Missile 
Challenge, POLICY Focus, May 1987 [hereinafter Carus, NATO]; see also McNaugher, Ballistic 
Missiles and Chemical Weapons: The Legacy of the Iran-Iraq War, INT'L SECURITY, Fall 1990, at 5. 
82 "Like Iraq, Iran is continuing to expand its chemical warfare program C!ven after the 
cease fire .... " Norman, supra note 80, at 888 (quoting William Webster, Director of the 
Central Intelligence Agency). Were cw to have had negligible impact in this war, as some 
analysts claim, such efforts would be less likely. While prestige and deterrence might also be 
arguments Jor the acquisition of chemical agents, both of these factors depend on the 
perception that the weapons are useful. 
83 Iran's nearly continuous pleas for stroriger condemnation of Iraq by the U.S. and the 
other members of the Security Council went essentially unheard until the summer of 1988, 
when Iraq used cw against its own Kurdish popuiation. See Statement of His Excellericy Dr. 
Ali Akbar Velayati, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the 
Conference on Disarmament 4 (July 28, 1987) (copy on file at the Boston College Third 
World Law Journal office). 
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this reticence of the international community into account in decid-
ing whether to escalate to the use of cwo Nations' reluctance to 
respond to the use of weapons banned by international law must 
also be factored into any decision to adopt the more comprehensive 
treaty currently under negotiation. This treaty may include sanc-
tions against use, possibly even military sanctions.84 
Finally, cw were clearly most effective when used against un-
protected civilians. Prior to April 8, 1987, when most of the Iraqi 
attacks were against military targets, 262 of the 27,571 victims of 
chemical warfare died.85 When the Iraqis began to attack population 
centers such as Sardasht and Halabja, thousands of civilians were 
killed.86 
Chemical weapons might be particularly well-suited for use in 
the Middle East for several reasons. Because the missiles stockpiled 
by the Arab states are relatively inaccurate,87 a weapon with a large 
"footprint" (one that affects a large area) is desirable. Chemical 
agents offer just this possibility. The use of chemical agents greatly 
expands the area of destruction of artillery and short range mis-
siles.88 The most efficient use of chemical-agent-tipped missiles 
might be against population centers, against which pinpoint accu-
racy is not required to yield large-scale destruction. While a com-
prehensive civil defense program would be desirable, such a pro-
gram is clearly not feasible: the costs would be prohibitive for most 
8. The Geneva Protocol does not spell but terms of International retribution in the case 
of abrogation. The current discussions in Geneva are still inconclusive with respect to the 
Treaty regime's response to abrogations, particularly in the case of use; possibilities include 
aid to victims, including military aid. See United Nations Conference on Disarmament CDt 
952, app. II. 
Another possibility, suggested by Raymond Cohen and Robin Ranger of the U.S. Institute 
for Peace, would be to maintain an international stockpile of cw with which to supply victims 
of a chemical attack in order to retaliate in kind. This plan, though thought-provoking, 
would hardly sharpen the teeth of international law. R. COHEN & R. RANGER, ENFORCING CW 
LIMITS: AN INTERNATIONAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS AUTHORITY (1989). 
85 Carus, Chemical Weapons, supra note 80, at 7. 
86 With respect to Sardasht, see Statement of His Excellency Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati, 
supra note 83, at 1-2. The United Nations investigative teams first noted many civilian 
casualties in May 1987. United Nations Security Council, Report of the Mission Dispatched by the 
Secretary-General to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Conflict Between 
the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq, U.N. Doc. 5118852, May 18, 1987. Thousands of civilians 
were killed in an Iraqi attack on the town of Halabja (an Iraqi town then held by Iran) in 
mid-March, 1988. Winds of Death: Iraq's Use of Poison Gas Against Its Kurdish Population, supra 
note 63, at 13. 
87 R. Shuey, supra note 81, at 8; see also Carus, NATO, supra note 81. 
88 See THE MILITARY BALANCE 1988-89 247, 249 (International Institute of Strategic 
Studies, 1988). 
62 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11:45 
nations, and the likelihood of successful defense is slim.89 Moreover, 
cw are most effective in hot climates, because of the physical prop-
erties of the agents themselves and the physical strain on troops 
forced to wear protective gear in hot and humid weather.90 If more 
lethal, skin-penetrating agents had been used against Iranian forces 
in the Iran-Iraq War, the mortality rate for Iranian soldiers would 
have been much higher. Such agents might be used in future wars, 
and even armed forces well-equipped with chemical defense (such 
as the U.S.) are not well-equipped for hot climates.91 
2. Possible Use ,by Terrorists 
Finally, the possibility exists that terrorists could use, or 
threaten to use, cbw in the Middle East. Predicting whether a ter-
rorist group will use cbw is a task filled with uncertainty.92 The 
potential for terrorists to use cbw has existed for some time, but 
the actual use of cbw for terrorist purposes has rarely occurred.93 
Terrorists operate under some of the same technical constraints 
regarding cbw as do legitimate governments. The dependency of 
cbw on uncertain and difficult-to-predict meteorological factors, the 
difficulties in maintaining the potency of bw agents and the prob-
lems of predicting and controlling the spread of cbw are obstacles 
89 Successful protection of population centers would require an extremely elaborate 
system, probably impossible to engineer. It would require that intelligence about an imminent 
chemical attack be available to give civilians time to don protective gear or time to transport 
themselves to collective protection units. It would not be enough to instruct people to go to 
the uppermost floors of office buildings (presumably above the agent cloud) because air is 
circulated throughout many buildings. 
90 The effect of mustard, for example, is greatly enhanced if the victim's skin is moist. 
VX, a nerve agent, is also more effective in hot climates because the increased vapor pressure 
results in higher airborne concentrations of the poison. For physical and chemical properties 
of chemical agents, see Department of the Army, Military Chemistry and Chemical Com-
pounds (Oct. 1975) (Field Manual FM 3-9, AFR 355-7). For a discussion of vapor pressure, 
see P. ATKINS, PHYSICAL CHEMISTRY 185-91 (1982). 
91 J. Stern, The Chemical Weapons Threat to U.S. National Security: A Policy Assess-
ment, 53-55 (1988) (Masters Thesis, available at Massachusetts Institute of Technology) 
[hereinafter J. Stern, The Chemical Weapons Threat] (copy on file at the Boston College 
Third World Law Journal office). 
92 In a congressional report on binary cw, one analyst noted, "An analysis of such a 
prospect [referring to terrorist use of binary cw] is necessarily speculative .... There are 
limits to our knowledge of terrorist motivation as well as behavior, which are especially 
apparent with respect to chemical terrorism." BINARY WEAPONS, supra note 36, at 31. 
93 See J. SIMON, TERRORISTS AND THE POTENTIAL USE OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS: A DIS-
CUSSION OF POSSIBILITIES 11 (1989) (prepared for the U.s. Armed Forces Medical Intelligence 
Center by RAND). 
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in the use of cbw that plague governments and terrorists alike.94 
Other technical considerations exist that would not necessarily curb 
the behavior of governments, but do prevent terrorist use of cbw. 
For example, fashioning a practical chemical or biological weapon 
requires specialized resources, knowledge of chemistry or microbi-
ology and technical expertise not likely to exist within many terrorist 
organizations.95 For biological and toxin weapons, there are few 
reliable means of delivering the agent to the desired target. Also, 
the dangerousness of the substances and consequent care with 
which they must be handled further deter terrorists. Some of these 
difficulties, however, would not affect terrorists operating under 
the sponsorship of governments, unless the governments them-
selves were technologically limited in this respect. 96 
Technical considerations, however, do not function as a binding 
constraint. Cumulatively, they could present formidable obstacles, 
but no greater than those that terrorists have overcome in the past.97 
Apparently, other checks on terrorists' behavior have been operat-
ing to keep the use of cbw so low (with the exception of poisonings) 
as to be nonexistent for practical purposes. 
As a rule, terrorists do not commit wanton murder.98 The desire 
of many terrorist groups to be treated as legitimate governments 
may act as a restraint upon the level of violence they undertake.99 
A decision to use or threaten to use a weapon of mass destruction 
94 These and other technological barriers to the terrorist use of nuclear, chemical and 
biological weapons are discussed in BINARY WEAPONS, supra note 36, at 38-41, 45. 
95 Simon dismisses this argument: "Dispersing various biological agents into the atmo-
sphere can be done by 'independent' terrorist groups that have some understanding of 
science. For operations that require more technical knowledge, a terrorist group can always 
recruit the necessary people." J. SIMON, supra note 93, at 15. 
96 See J. McDERMOTT, THE KILLING WINDS: THE MENACE OF BIOLOGICAL WARFARE 252 
(1987). 
97 jeffrey Simon describes the technological sophistication of the bomb that destroyed 
the Pan Am jetliner in December 1988 over Lockerbie, Scotland. J. SIMON, supra note 93, at 
17. 
9" "Terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead . ... Most terrorists 
adhere to the principle of the 'minimum force necessary,' that is, they try to apply just enough 
violence to achieve their tactical objectives .... " B. JENKINS, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: 
THE OTHER WORLD WAR 22-23 (Nov. 1985) (a Project AIR FORCE report prepared for the 
U.S. Air Force by RAND); see also Lacqueur, Reflections on Terrorism, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Fall 
1986, at 87. During the 1980's terrorist attacks became more violent (1. SIMON, supra note 
93, at 5); the use of cbw in a terrorist attack could threaten tens of thousands of people, 
which is several orders of magnitude greater than the deadliest terrorist attack to date. In 
1985, the bombing of an Air India flight caused 363 deaths; the bombing of the Pan Am 
flight over Lockerbie, Scotland caused 270 deaths. Id. 
99 B. JENKINS, supra note 98, at 23-24. 
64 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11:45 
could also provoke internal dissension leading to betrayal or col-
lapse. loo Moreover, even a threat to kill a large number of people 
through conventional or unconventional means-nuclear, chemical 
or biological-could mobilize the resources of a government to 
decimate the group making the threat. lOI 
On the other hand, there are also technical characteristics of 
cbw, particularly as compared to nuclear weapons, that would make 
them attractive to terrorists intent on what has been described as 
"macro-terrorism-the terror of mass-disruption or mass mur-
der."102 First, cbw would be easier to obtain than fissionable material. 
Second, because such a small quantity of agent or toxin is deadly, 
transportation and delivery of the weapon could, at least in some 
scenarios, be carried out by a small number of people. Third, be-
cause of the difficulty in detecting bw agents and the speed with 
which many chemical agents act, defending against a cbw attack 
after it had occurred would be difficult if not impossible. 103 Finally, 
compared to other weapons of mass destruction, cbw are relatively 
mexpenslve. 
Jeffrey Simon, a RAND analyst, distinguishes among terrorist 
groups and predicts the following characteristics of those likely to 
use bw, all of which also apply to cw: 
-A general undefined constituency whose possible reaction to 
a bw attack does not concern the terrorist group. 
-A previous pattern of large-scale, high-casualty-inflicting in-
cidents. 
-Demonstration of a certain degree of sophistication 10 wea-
ponry or tactics. 
-A willingness to take risks. lo4 
100 "Former terrorists have indicated in interviews that each escalation in violence pro-
vokes debate and dissension within their ranks." Id. at 24. For a full account of a former 
member of a religious commune divulging to the Federal Bureau of Investigations the use 
of bacteria by the group to infect voters in a small city in Oregon, see J. McDERMOTT, supra 
note 96, at 247-49. 
III I BINARY WEAPONS, supra note 36, at 38 (quoting Kupperman, Nuclear Ternmsm: 
Armchair Pastime or Genuine Thought?, JERUSALEM J. INT'L REL., Summer 1978, at 24. Dr. 
Robert Kupperman, terrorism expert at the Center of Strategic and International Studies at 
Georgetown University, states, "To use any biological [weapon] is a vast escalation over what 
they have done. If terrorists start to use them, there is no end to which a nation would not 
go to stop them." Quoted in J. McDERMOTT, supra note 96, at 254-55. 
10' Will, Calculating the Public Interest, in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: CHALLENGE AND 
RESPONSE, 208, 211-12 (B. Netanyahu ed. 1980). 
1Il3 Exposure to some nerve agents, particularly Soman, can be treated with injections. 
To be effective, however, the treatment must be administered within seconds. Ex post 
treatment of slower acting agents, such as mustard, would be more feasible. 
104 J. SIMON, supra note 93, at 17. 
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Simon describes a few terrorist groups that display one or two of 
these characteristics, but none that exhibit all of them. 105 This dis-
cussion does not suggest that terrorists would never use cbw, or that 
the use of cbw by terrorists is inevitable, as some writers propose. 106 
Rather it emphasizes the difficulty in predicting whether terrorists 
are likely to use cbw. 
If a terrorist group used such weapons, however, several factors 
favor chemical over biological terrorism. First, chemical agents are 
easier to disseminate. Second, unlike bw, chemical agents have been 
deployed successfully on the battlefield; there is less uncertainty 
about their effects. Third, terrorists' use of bw would likely incite a 
far more severe reaction on the part of the public and of govern-
ments. Unlike bw, the norm of non-use of cw has eroded. The 
muffled and ambiguous international response to the Iraqi use of 
chemical agents against the Kurds, in particular, suggests that al-
though nations may be horrified by the slaying of civilians with toxic 
chemicals, they are not willing to respond with stiff measures, such 
as sanctions. It is evident, therefore, that the possible use by terror-
ists of cw in particular should not be ignored in considering how to 
minimize cbw use. 
V. CONTROLLING THE SPREAD OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS TO THE 
THIRD WORLD 
The international community is following two strategies to con-
trol the spread of cw to the Third World: negotiations toward an 
international agreement that would ban the possession of cw and, 
in the interim, various unilateral and multilateral approaches to 
limit the export of chemicals and technology. 
A. Chemical Weapons Convention Negotiations 
The United Nations Committee on Disarmament formally es-
tablished the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons in 
i05 Simon identifies the Japanese Red Army, the European Red Army Faction and neo-
nazi groups in the U.S. as not having well-defined constituencies. Groups previously engaging 
in large-scale violence include the Japanese Red Army as well as pro-Iranian Shiite funda-
mentalist groups, such as Hizbollah and Palestinian extremists, such as the Abu Nidal orga-
nization and Sikh extremists in India. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-
General Command is suspected of committing the technologically sophisticated Pan Am 
attack. [d. at 17-20. 
IOfi See, e.g., J. DOUGLASS, JR., & N. LIVINGSTONE, AMERICA THE VULNERABLE: THE 
THREAT OF CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (1987). 
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1980.107 The Working Group was later reorganized as the Ad Hoc 
Committee on Chemical Weapons under the Conference on Dis-
armament in 1984. 108 One of the principal objectives of the forty 
voting participants of the Conference on Disarmament has been to 
draft a treaty, to be adopted essentially universally, that would ban 
CW.109 In 1984, the U.S. proposed a treaty text providing for on-site 
inspections that has served as the basis for these negotiations. llo 
The proposed multilateral ban on cw, like the Biological Weap-
ons Convention, would ban stockpiling, production, and transna-
tional transfer of materials and technologies for cwo It would also 
require the destruction of existing cw stockpiles. I I I Unlike the Bi-
ological Weapons Convention, however, the prospective treaty in-
corporates stringent verification measures.ll2 The verification re-
gime would include: regular on-site inspections by an international 
Inspectorate and continuous remote monitoring of declared facili-
ties and destruction sites for cw; systematic inspections of civilian 
or governmental chemical plants that produce dual-use chemicals; 
and the possibility of challenge inspections of any facility suspected 
of producing illicit materials. \l3 The proposed agreement would 
107 T. BERNAUER, supra note 7, at 226. 
108 [d. at 5-6, 226. 
109 [d. at 14-18. 
110 See United Nations Conference on Disarmament CD/500. 
III The provisional text of the convention reads: "1. Each State Party undertakes not 
to: develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, 
directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone .... 5. Each State Party undertakes to 
destroy chemical weapons which are in its possession or under its [jurisdiction or] control." 
United Nations Conference on Disarmament CD/952, at 20. 
lI2 [d. at 33,38-41,76-81. 
113 Chemicals covered by the Convention are divided into three schedules, based on the 
risk they pose to the objectives of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Schedule I (see United 
Nations Conference on Disarmament CD/952, at 51-52) includes all known chemical warfare 
agents, except phosgene and hydrogen cyanide (which are important industrial reagents and 
of lesser interest as weapons, found in Schedule III), plus alkylphosonyldifluorides (direct 
precursor to Sarin and Soman), the toxins saxtoxin and ricin, and direct precursors to VX. 
Schedule II (id. at 53-54) includes important precursors to these agents, which may be 
important to industry, or chemicals that are "deemed to pose a significant risk to the objectives 
of the Convention." [d. at 57. Schedule III (see id. at 55) includes chemicals that could be 
used in war, or to manufacture warfare agents, or that possess physical, chemical or toxico-
logical properties similar to those of cwo These chemicals, which are used in industry in very 
large quantities, are considered to pose the least risk to the objectives of the convention. For 
a detailed discussion of the risk classes see T. BERNAUER, supra note 7, at 119-22. 
The "rolling text" (convention as written so far) includes: a protocol for challenge 
inspections (United Nations Conference on Disarmament CD/952, at 152-53 and at 193-
96); a regime for Schedule I chemicals (id. at 107-109); a regime for Schedule II chemicals 
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allow production of "super-toxic lethal"114 substances for permitted 
purposes liS in quantities not to exceed one metric ton at any single 
declared facility.116 It would also subject this facility to regular on-
site inspections and continuous monitoring with on-site sensors and 
transmission systems. 117 Manufacture of chemicals important to in-
dustry, but which might also be used in war or to produce chemical 
warfare agents, would be closely monitored by regular on-site and 
material balance inspections. I IS 
Negotiators at the Conference on Disarmament have agreed 
upon many of the provisions of the proposed Chemical Weapons 
Convention. The problems remaining are predominantly associated 
with the implementation of verification: who will do it and how it 
will be done. There is little argument, however, about verifying the 
destruction of existing stocks of cwo With these existing weapons, 
there will be immediate on-site inspection of chemical stockpiles and 
of production facilities with follow-up inspections of the destruction 
process, supplemented perhaps by remote monitoring. 119 Much 
more difficult is verification of non-production. This problem is not 
surprising, given the inherent difficulties in proving that something 
does not exist. Particularly contentious is the protocol for on-site 
inspections on challenge, the purpose of which is to provide States 
Parties the means with which to verify non-production of cw at 
(id. at III-IS); a regime for Schedule III chemicals (id. at 119-20); and a regime for 
monitoring of storage facilities and cw destruction (id. at 77-102). 
114 "Super-toxic lethal chemicals" are defined as "chemical[s] which have a median lethal 
dose which is less than or equivalent to .5 mg/kg (subcutaneous administration) or 2,000 mg-
minim' (by inhalation) when measured by an agreed method .... " [d. at 49. Super-toxic 
lethal chemicals are categorized as Schedule I chemicals. 
liS "Purposes not prohibited by the Convention" are defined as: "(a) industrial, agricul-
tural, research, medical or other peaceful purposes, domestic law enforcement purposes; 
and military purposes not connected with the use of chemical weapons. (b) protective pur-
poses, namely those purposes directly related to protection against chemical weapons." [d. at 
22. 
116 Production of laboratory quantities of Schedule I chemicals outside the "single small-
scale production facility" will be allowed in quantities not to exceed an aggregate quantity of 
10 kilograms per year per facility. [d. at 107-09. 
117 [d. at 108-09. 
liB These are the Schedule II and Schedule III chemicals. See id. at 53-54, 55. 
119 [d. at 77-102. 
The U.S. and the Soviet Union agreed to commence bilateral inspections of each other's 
facilities before the completion of the global ban. See Department of State, Memorandum of 
Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America and the Govern-
ment of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding a Bilateral Verification Ex-
periment and Data Exchange Related to the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (copy on file 
at the Boston College Third World Law Journal office). 
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facilities not covered by regular inspections, or in cases of suspicious 
activities at any facility.120 
Bipolar tension between the U.S. and the Soviet Union made 
negotiations between these two countries the center of attention for 
control of cw, although the recent break in this tension has made 
this context less relevant. Prior to Gorbachev's tenure as General 
Secretary, the Soviet Union was adamantly opposed to on-site in-
spections, considered by the Socialist Group to be a form oflegalized 
spying, and by the Western Group as essential to effective verifica-
tion. 121 In August 1987, shortly after making similar concessions 
120 While the conflict between Western and Socialist countries has largely been resolved, 
the issue of challenge inspections is still being negotiated. The U.S. proposal (United Nations 
Conference on Disarmament CD/500, at 2-3, art. IX & X) includes a "Fact Finding Panel" 
which would consist of representatives of the Soviet Union, the U.S., one Socialist, one 
Western, and one Neutral or Non-Aligned country. The purpose of the Panel would be to 
decide whether the request for a challenge inspection was legitimate. See T. BERNAUER, supra 
note 7, at 177. There were many objections to the U.S. position, and the Fact Finding Panel 
is not included in the rolling text. I d. 
Legal scholars expressed concern that these inspections might violate the fourth amend-
ment rights of the inspected parties, though the question is disputed. See, e.g., Tanzman, 
Constitutionality of Warrantless On-Site Arms Control Inspections in the United States, 13 YALE J. 
INT'L L. 21 (1988). 
121 Up until the early 1980's, on-site inspection was considered by many delegations to 
be politically impracticable; many nations considered such schemes too intrusive, even a form 
of legalized spying. Attention, particularly amongst the Eastern bloc nations, focused on non-
intrusive techniques, such as material balance or analysis of effluent by waste water monitor-
ing or passive infrared detection. There evolved a general feeling among many Western 
delegations, however, that these remote sensing techniques would be inadequate to monitor 
compliance. Despite the rapid increase in the sensitivity of these technologies, they are still 
not yet practicable in this context. 
With the advent of the Reagan Administration, on-site inspections were increasingly part 
of the discussion. The U.S. considered challenge inspections to be essential to the regime. 
Many of the early proposals looked at nonintrusive forms of verification, but obligatory on-
site inspection became an important part of the discussion as early as 1974. Proposals for 
on-site verification of destruction of stocks, shutdown of cw plants and nonproduction were 
tabled by the U.S., the United Kingdom and Sweden. (United Nations Conference of the 
Committee on Disarmament CCD/436, tabled by the U.S. on July 16, 1974, discussed veri-
fication of destruction of stocks. Another document, United Nations Conference of the 
Committee on Disarmament CCD/437, tabled by the U.S. on the same day, discussed obli-
gatory on-site verification of nonproduction. Other early proposals for on-site verification 
include United Nations Conference of the Committee on Disarmament CCD/PV,704, tabled 
by Sweden on 22 April, 1976, and the UK draft convention, United Nations Conference of 
the Committee on Disarmament CCD/512 of Aug. 6, 1976.) 
On-site verification was met with a great deal of resistance by the Soviet Union, whose 
delegation claimed in 1977 that extraterritorial on-site verification is "inevitably associated 
with the disclosure of military, industrial and commercial secrets and consequently cannot 
be justified from the standpoint of assuring the security and economic interests of the States 
parties to a future agreement." United Nations Conference of the Committee on Disarma-
ment CCD/538, Aug, 3, 1977 (Soviet Union), 
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related to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty, the Soviet 
Union agreed to an on-site inspection regime even more stringent 
than that outlined in the U.S. draft. 122 Paradoxically, after the Soviet 
Union conceded to U.S. demands, concern that challenge inspec-
tions might threaten U.S. national security suddenly rose to the 
fore. 123 
Substantial progress has been achieved, however, in bilateral 
negotiations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. In June 1990, 
President Bush and President Gorbachev signed an executive agree-
ment outlining a plan for mutual reductions of chemical stockpiles 
down to approximately 5000 agent-tons by the year 2002.124 Presi-
dent Bush agreed to cease production of binary munitions imme-
diately; 125 the Soviet Union announced in 1987 that it had stopped 
producing CW. 126 While the degree of verifiability required to mon-
itor compliance with the proposed Chemical Weapons Convention 
is unclear, this issue is probably more relevant in the U.S.-Soviet 
context than to the Treaty's ability to halt horizontal proliferation. 
Analysts believe that the chemical industries of the developing coun-
122 See Statement by E.A. Shevardnadze, at the Conference on Disarmament (Aug. 6, 
1987) (unofficial translation) [hereinafter ShevardnadzeJ. 
123 According to the provisions of the U.S. draft, any governmental facility, including 
secret National Security Administration, CIA and nuclear weapons design and manufacturing 
facilities, might be vulnerable to challenge inspections on an anytime anywhere basis, within 
24 to 48 hours of the request for the inspection on the part of any State party to the treaty. 
United Nations Conference on Disarmament CD/500 1984, at 10,11. The U.S. draft (article 
X) proposed inspections of governmental facilities without the right of refusal, but private 
facilities would have the option to refuse inspections. [d. at art. Xl. This differentiation 
between private and government facilities, intended to protect the fourth amendment rights 
of the inspected parties, was considered discriminatory against the Socialist States, whose 
industries are all government-owned. See Smidovich, Principles and Procedures for Verification, 
in IMPLEMENTING A GLOBAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION 2 (E. Arnett ed. 1987). The 
members of the Conference on Disarmament, however, have not yet resolved the protocol 
for challenge inspections. 
124 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics-United States: Agreement on Destruction and Non-
Production of Chemical Weapons and on Measures to Facilitate the Multilateral Convention on Banning 
Chemical Weapons 29 I.L.M. 932, 935 (1990). Article III states: "Upon entry into force of the 
Agreement and thereafter, each party shall not produce chemical weapons." [d. at 934. 
Article IV states: "Each Party shall reduce and limit its chemical weapons so that, by no later 
than December 31, 2002, and thereafter, its aggregate quantity of chemical weapons does 
not exceed 5000 agent-tons." [d. 
125 This is implicit in the wording of Article III. [d. at 934. 
126 General Secretary Gorbachev proclaimed in Prague on April 10, 1987, "I can tell 
you that the Soviet Union has stopped making chemical weapons. As you know, the other 
Warsaw Treaty countries have never produced such weapons and never had them on their 
territory." United Nations Conference on Disarmament CD1751, at 5. 
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tries will be far easier to monitor than those of the developed 
world. 127 
B. The Chemical Weapons Convention's Impact in the Middle East 
U.S. efforts to ban cw were initially driven by the desire to 
reduce the Soviet chemical threat, not only because that nation was 
the U.S.'s principal adversary, but also because the Soviet Union 
maintained the largest chemical stockpile in the world. 128 Three 
factors, however, may now diminish the threat of chemical warfare 
in the European theater. First, the bilateral agreement will substan-
tially reduce the Soviet stockpile to 5000 agent-tons by the year 
2002.129 Second, the Soviet Union appears willing to adopt the 
multilateral cw treaty, which would ultimately entail complete de-
struction of all stocks of CW.130 Third, changes in the Warsaw Pact 
reduce the threat of chemical warfare in Europe. 
At the same time, several variables suggest that the prospect of 
chemical warfare in the Middle East is becoming far more menac-
ing. These variables include: the proliferation of ballistic missiles, 
as well as cw, throughout the region; 131 continuing inter-Arab, Arab-
Iranian, and Arab-Israeli tensions; the paucity of protective gear; 
127 
[TJhe developing countries have a limited and/or primitive industrial and techno-
logical base, which makes it easy to monitor and spot any attempt to violate the 
provisions of the Convention. In most cases, if these countries became involved in 
chemical weapons production, they would rely for many of their basic needs on the 
developed countries. This makes verification of compliance by the developing coun-
tries much easier. On the other hand, the technological and industrial capacities 
which make chemical weapons production possible are widely diffused within the 
industrial and economic structure of the developed countries, and their use in secret 
production of chemical weapons would be difficult to trace, unless intrusive measures 
are devised. 
Ezz, The Chemical Weapons Convention: Particular Concerns for Developing Countries, 2 UNIDIR 
NEWSLEITER, March 1989, at 1. 
While it is difficult to dispute the veracity of General Ezz's claim that "most" developing 
countries would be forced to rely on developed countries for help in cw manufacture, there 
is no guarantee that private companies will abide by the terms of the Convention (i.e., not 
sell cw precursors). The numerous examples in the press of private companies abrogating 
or finding loopholes in export control laws do not bode well. See, e.g., Thatcher and Aeppel, 
supra note 60. 
It is the few developing countries pursuing indigenous, secret manufacture of cw that 
pose the greatest risk to the objectives of the Convention. See supra note 80. 
128 See supra note 3. 
129 See supra note 124. 
130 See Shevardnadze, supra note 122, at 9-10. 
131 See R. Shuey, supra note 87, at 1-3. 
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and the difficulty of protecting troops in hot climates. 132 In marked 
contrast to the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the Middle East nations 
have been expanding their stockpiles. 133 For all these reasons, the 
proposed Chemical Weapons Convention would almost certainly 
have its biggest impact in the developing world, particularly in the 
Middle East-not in the U.S.-Soviet context. 
On the other hand, the combination of international monitor-
ing and export controls will make production of cw hard to conceal 
and more expensive for nations whose chemical industries are not 
highly developed. This expense, combined with the threat of dis-
closure and the likelihood that adversaries would take steps to de-
fend themselves against chemical attack, would add to the costs of 
pursuing chemical warfare, particularly in the case of lesser-devel-
oped countries. Moreover, if developing countries that are consid-
ering the acquisition of cw are convinced that their potential adver-
saries no longer stockpile cw, the incentive to acquire them may be 
lessened, even if the nation in question is not a Party to the Chemical 
Weapons Convention. This incentive is doubly reduced for signa-
tories to the Convention. 
At least two factors threaten the effectiveness of the Chemical 
Weapons Convention in the Middle East. First, it is not at all certain 
that these countries will adopt the treaty. At the conference on the 
Geneva Protocol in Paris in January 1989,134 Iraqi Foreign Minister 
Tarik Aziz claimed, "Iraq believes that any call for a comprehensive 
ban on chemical weapons must be coupled with a parallel and 
similar call for a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons."135 The 
twenty-two member Arab league initially expressed support for this 
view, although by the Conference's end all 149 participants signed 
the final Declaration opposing chemical warfare, settling for a para-
graph that urged "general and complete disarmament" without 
mentioning nuclear weapons specifically or formally linking chem-
ical and nuclear disarmament. 136 Although the early statements by 
Iraq and the Arab league might be seen as political posturing with 
1>. See J. Stern, The Chemical Weapons Threat, supra note 91, at 51-55. 
133 See supra note 80. 
134 The "Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and Other Interested 
States on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons" was held in Paris from January 7-11, 1989. 
One hundred forty-nine States participated. See T. BERNAUER, supra note 7, at 55-56. 
135 Tuohy, Link a Poison-Gas Ban to Atomic Weapons, Arabs Say, L.A. Times, Jan. 9, 1989, 
at 10. 
136 Text of the Declaration From the Paris Conference on Chemical Weapons, N.Y. Times, Jan. 
12, 1989, at AlO, col. 1. 
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respect to Israel, their support for chemical disarmament seems 
unlikely.137 Second, nations that have acquired these weapons, 
found to be useful in the Iran-Iraq War,138 may be less receptive to 
a cw ban. This problem will grow as their cw-manufacturing capa-
bility becomes more sophisticated and as increasing numbers of 
their potential adversaries acquire cwo 
C. Export Controls 
In part from impatience with the sluggish pace of the Chemical 
Weapons Convention negotiations, particularly in light of the dis-
turbing discovery that Western companies were responsible for most 
of Iraq's cw build-up,139 twenty Western nations, known as the 
Australia Group, have been cooperating in an effort to control 
proliferation. 140 These nations have been tracking cw precursors 
trade and controlling the sale of suspect chemicals and technologies 
to nations known to be seeking CW.141 
A number of problems with this informal export control regime 
imposed by the members of the Australia Group have emerged. 
For instance, it is possible to circumvent the regulations by arrang-
ing sales through third parties, as Iraq did in acquiring phosphorous 
oxychloride (a precursor to the nerve agent Tabun) in 1984.142 
137 The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran, Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati announced at the 
Conference on Disarmament: "To be frank, if the convention were ready today, the chances 
of its success in our region would be somewhere near zero .... " United Nations Conference 
on Disarmament CD/PV.543 (cited in CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION BULLETIN, June 1990, 
at 12). 
138 Useful, if not in a strictly military sense, at the very least in a political sense and a 
psychological sense. See Ekeus, The Option of Using Chemical Weapons, CHEMICAL WEAPONS 
CONVENTION BULLETIN, June 1990, at 1-13. 
139 See supra note 127. 
140 This group was formed at the suggestion of the Australian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. Its members are diplomats and members of the intelligence communities from 20 
Western nations and the European Community, including Australia, Austria, Belgium, Can-
ada, Denmark, West Germany, France, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Britain and the U.S. Thatcher, 
Their Secret Task is to Halt Spread of Chemical Weapons, Christian Science Monitor, Dec. 13, 
1988, at B 14; telephone interview with Trevor Wilson, Counsellor & Head of Political Branch 
of the Australian Embassy, Washington, D.C. (Dec. 3, 1990). 
The members of the Group meet twice a year to share intelligence on who is attempting 
to buy what from whom. They also discuss which precursors to cw might be banned for 
export. Thatcher, supra. 
141 Thatcher, supra note 140, at B 14. 
142 Phosphorus oxychloride is (and was) controlled for export from memb~rs of the 
European Economic Community. A Dutch company, Melchemie, accepted an order for 60 
tons of this chemical, but when pressure not to accept the order became too great, "company 
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Because the regime is strictly voluntary, and only twenty nations 
participate in the decision as to which precursors to monitor, it is 
fairly easy for a determined purchaser and a determined chemical 
trader to find a way around the regulations. 143 The recent sale of 
thionyl chloride to Iran, used to produce both mustard and the 
nerve agent Sarin, is but one example. A German company ar-
ranged the sale; the chemical was produced in India, which did not 
control export of this material. 144 In addition, many dual-purpose 
chemicals regulated by the Australia Group nations are produced 
in countries that do not regulate their trade. 145 
There is no law prohibiting newly industrialized nations from 
producing precisely those chemicals and materials that the Australia 
Group hopes to keep out of the hands of nations in search of cwo 
Indeed, those who choose to produce and export these chemicals 
would control a greater share of the market. The scarcity of these 
chemicals, resulting from the reduction in the number of suppliers, 
would lead to higher profits for companies that do not abide by the 
Australia Group Controls. Furthermore, producer states would 
have control over which nations would have access to the chemicals. 
Extralegal efforts of the kind undertaken by the Australia 
Group are unlikely to be as effective at stopping proliferation as a 
cw ban, which would have a legal mandate and would capture more 
of the producer nations than even an augmented Australia Group. 
The U.S., however, has a number of unilateral and multilateral 
options to redress the weaknesses in the current export control 
regime. These alternatives can be classified into three categories: 
first, efforts to dissuade both domestic and foreign chemical man-
ufacturers from selling cw precursors to the Middle East nations, 
including fines and loss of export/import rights; second, the imple-
officials suggested to the Iraqis that they buy the same materials from Ausidet, a division of 
the Italian chemical conglomerate Montedison. The Italians agreed to the sale, and purchased 
the chemicals for Iraq from the French company ATOCHEM .... Middle East Defense News, 
Oct. 24, 1988, at 4. 
14S International law provides no mechanism for enforcing the Australia Group; it is a 
voluntary organization. Each country may decide how many and which chemicals to control. 
See Thatcher, supra note 140, at BI4-BI5; see also SIPRI CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WARFARE 
STUDIES, No.4: THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY AND THE PROJECTED CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVEN-
TION 96 (J. Robinson ed. 1986) (partial list of which countries control which chemicals). 
144 Hazarika, India Says It Sold Iran a Chemical Used in Poison Gas, N.Y. Times, July 1, 
1989, at 1, col. 4. 
145 For example, potassium fluoride (a precursor of the nerve agent Tabun) is now 
regulated in many countries, but it is produced in Argentina and Brazil; dimethylamine (also 
a precursor of Tabun) is produced in India and Romania; phosphorous trichloride (a pre-
cursor of nerve agents) is produced in Brazil, China, India and the Soviet Union. 
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mentation of a regime for sanctions targeting countries that pur-
chase contraband materials; and, third, mandatory sanctions against 
use. 
Last year, the V.S. House of Representatives and the Senate 
passed competing versions of sanctions legislation. 146 Both bills 
would amend V.S. trade law to require export controls on precur-
sors to CW. 147 Both also would require sanctions against companies 
or persons who knowingly contribute to the efforts of any nation 
to produce or use cbw. 148 In addition, they would require sanctions 
against countries that use cbw in war or against their own citizens 
or that are making substantial preparations to do SO.149 The Senate 
bill (S.195) includes more stringent sanctions. 15o The House bill 
146 The Senate bill, S.195, passed unanimously in May 1990. The House bill, H.R. 3033, 
passed in November 1989. At the time of this writing, a conference bill has passed and awaits 
President Bush's decision to sign or to veto. Wines, Bush Weighs a Veto of Sanctions for the 
Spread of Chemical Arms, N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1990, at A12, col. 3. 
147 The House and Senate bills contain almost identical language on this point. "Section 
6 of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405 [(1982)]) is amended by 
adding at the end the following 
(q) Chemical and Biological Weapons-a validated license shall be required under 
this section for the export of any goods or technology that the President determines 
would assist the recipient country in acquiring the capability to develop, produce, 
stockpile, deliver, or use chemical or biological weapons, unless the destination of 
such export is a country with whose government the United States has entered into 
bilateral or multilateral arrangements for the control of chemical or biological weap-
ons related goods or technology." 
H.R. 3033, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., § 102(b) (1989); see also S. 195, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 
§ 202(b) (1989). 
148 The Senate bill states that the President "shall impose on a foreign person the 
sanctions under subsection (b) if the President determines that the foreign person ... has 
knowingly and substantially contributed to the efforts to use, develop, produce, stockpile, 
otherwise acquire chemical or biological weapons by any country that ... " used cbw, or 
made substantial preparations to do so, or has been designated as a nation that supports 
terrorism. S. 195, § 203(a). The language of the House bill is almost identical. See H.R. 1033, 
§ 103(a). 
The actual sanctions proposed by both bills include that the U.S. government shall not 
procure goods or services from the foreign person and that import rights into the U.S. shall 
be revoked. S. 195, § 203(b); H.R. 3033, § 103(c). 
149 "It is the purpose of this Act-(1) to mandate United States sanctions and to en-
courage international sanctions against countries that use chemical or biological weapons in 
violation of international law or use lethal chemical or biological weapons against their own 
nationals." S. 195, § 3. "If, at any time, the President determines that a country has engaged 
in activities described in section 201(1), the President shall forthwith impose the sanctions 
set forth .... " H.R. 3033, § 201(a). Section 201(1) covers the use of "chemical or biological 
weapons in violation of international law." [d. at § 201(1). 
150 The essential differences are that in the House version, the President must impose 
at least three sanctions out of a list of eight and must impose an additional sanction if in 
three months the country in question has not ceased using cwo The House list includes as an 
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(H.R.3033) is preferred by the Bush Administration because it al-
lows the President substantially more flexibility in the imposition of 
sanctions against countries. lsl 
The U.S. chemical industry objects to the imposition of any 
additional restrictions on U.S. companies, claiming that U.S. export 
controls are the most stringent in the world and that their ability to 
compete is consequently already impaired. 152 Instead, they support 
multilateral efforts. ls3 Another argument against applying unilat-
eral sanctions to companies is that they might be misconstrued as 
trade restrictions. Senator Helms anticipated this argument, and 
quoted from the GATT as follows: "[N]othing in this Agreement 
shall be construed ... to prevent any contracting party from taking 
any action which it considers necessary for the protection of its 
essential security interests .... "154 
At Senate hearings, Elisa Harris, Senior Analyst at the Brook-
ings Institute, claimed that sanctions against companies would have 
option the suspension or downgrade of diplomatic relations, a sanction not included on the 
Senate list. H.R. 3033, §§ 202(a) and (c). 
The Senate bill contains a list of 10 mandatory sanctions, seven of which are similar to 
those in the House bill, but also including termination of landing rights, prohibition of U.S. 
banks from making loans to the country in question, and denial of export licenses. S. 195, 
§§ 101, 102. The Senate bill allows the President to waive the sanctions if doing so is in "the 
national interest." S. 195, § 102. 
151 "It [So 195] is opposed by the Administration, which prefers the House bill, H.R. 
3033, in that it allows the President more discretion in applying the sanctions." CHEMICAL 
WEAPONS CONVENTION BULLETIN, Nov. 1989, at 12. "Testimony [on June 22, 1989, before 
the Subcommittee on International Finance and Monetary Policy of the Committee on 
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs] from Under Secretary of State Reginald Bartholomew 
reiterates the administration's opposition to automatic sanctions, whether against countries 
that use cw or companies that aid proliferation, but reaffirms the administration's readiness 
to work with Congress on developing some form of sanctions legislation." [d. at 5. Secretary 
of State James Baker said that the Senate version "does not give the President sufficient 
flexibility to impose or waive sanctions based on a consideration of the nation's security 
interests." Wines, supra note 146, at A12. 
152 "The existing U.S. export control system constitutes the single most restrictive such 
program in the world. Additional regulatory controls (particularly those imposed unilaterally) 
that unduly restrict legitimate business, and impose a competitive disadvantage, are neither 
warranted nor necessary." Written Statement of M. Turnipseed, on behalf of the Chemical 
Manufacturers' Association, before the Subcommittee on International Finance and Monetary 
Policy, June 22, 1989 at 1-2 [hereinafter M. Turnipseed]. The Chemical Manufacturers' 
Association favors multilateral cooperation as opposed to "unilateral control, or threats of 
sanctions." [d. at 3. See also Written Statement of Dr. Will Carpenter, on behalf of the Chemical 
Manufacturers' Association, before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 9, 1989, 
at 2-3 (available from Chemical Manufacturers' Association). 
153 See id. 
154 S. 138, IOlst Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONGo REC. S679, S680 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1989) 
(quoting General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 188 U.N.T.S. 266). 
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significant political value. 155 Even unilaterally imposed sanctions, 
she claims, would send the message to supplier countries and to 
domestic and foreign manufacturers that the V.S. is serious about 
stopping the flow of precursors to cw into the developing world. 156 
The degree to which the political and financial cost of illicit chemical 
trade would be raised by sanctions of this kind depends upon the 
number of nations that are willing to comply with a regime of 
sanctions. 
There are several potential problems with sanctions. Their use 
might make it more difficult to use diplomacy to end conflicts. 
There may be overriding foreign policy interests. In addition, sanc-
tions have rarely achieved their intended objectives in the past. 
Increasing international interdependence has resulted in the 
greater likelihood of finding alternative sources for the commodities 
in question, especially, but not exclusively, if the sanctions were 
unilaterally imposed. 
According to a recent study published by the International 
Institute of Economics, of the nine cases where sanctions were 
imposed against countries in connection with nuclear safeguards or 
nuclear reprocessing to dissuade the target country from pursuing 
an indigenous nuclear capability, only two were effective. 157 In both 
of these cases, United States and Canada v. South Korea and United 
States v. Taiwan, the V.S. had significant leverage. The authors of 
the study conclude that in most cases, sanctions do not contribute 
very much to the achievement of foreign policy goals. Exceptions 
are more likely if the policy goals are modest, the target country is 
weak or the target country is an ally rather than an adversary. 
155 E. Harris, Testimony before the Subcommittee on International Finance and Mon-
etary Policy, June 22, 1989, at 9. 
156 Harris claimed that sanctions against companies would send 
a clear message that the United States is not only concerned about the spread and 
use of chemical weapons, but is determined to take whatever steps are necessary to 
halt these developments. The real significance of this legislation, however, lies in its 
potential impact on international behavior. Sanctions against suppliers will force 
companies to look very carefully at orders for the items they provide. 
E. Harris, Testimony before the Subcommittee on International Finance and Monetary Policy, 
June 22, 1989, at 9. 
157 These nine case are: Canada v. India (1974-76); Canada v. Pakistan (1974-76); 
United States v. South Korea (1975-76); United States v. South Africa (1975-82); United 
States v. Taiwan (1976-77); United States v. Brazil (1978-81); United States v. Argentina 
(1978-82); United States v. India (1978-82); United States v. Pakistan (1979-80) (discussed 
in G. HUFBAUER, J. SCHOTT & K. ELLIOTT, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED: HISTORY 
AND POLICY, 496, 501, 505, 523, 540, 587, 592, 598, 636 (1985)). 
1991] CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS 77 
Sanctions that impose hardship on the sender country are less likely 
to succeed. Moreover, the greater the number of countries required 
to cooperate in implementing the sanctions, the greater the prob-
ability of failure. "Contrary to conventional wisdom, multilateral 
sanctions are not frequently associated with success."!58 The au-
thors, however, found that multilateral sanctions were more effec-
tive when designed in cooperation with allies.!59 
Within a treaty regime, export controls would be much more 
effective than the twenty-member Australia Group, because a larger 
number of nations would participate.!60 With respect to sanc-
tions aimed at stopping the flow of precursors, a global regime 
would greatly diminish the existence of alternative sources, 
as, at least in theory, the Convention would encompass all 
chemical-producing nations.!6! Sanctions would be less likely 
to impose hardship on a given chemical exporter!62 because 
the entire chemical industry would be subject to the same 
controls. 
The treaty could also provide the legal and political foundation 
for sanctions against use.!63 Sanctions imposed by parties to the 
Convention could be more effective than the unilateral sanctions in 
158 G. HUFBAUER, supra note 157, at 89. The authors' examples of multilateral sanctions 
regimes that have failed to achieve policy goals include the Arab embargo of Israel (id. at 
180-86) and the U.S. and Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls 
(COCOM) strategic controls against the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc (id. at 211-20). 
159 It is possible that reduction in U.S.-Soviet tensions will have a profound influence 
on the efficacy of multilateral sanctions regimes, because each side will no longer assume a 
priori that its aim must be to circumvent the efforts of the other. The large number of 
countries that were willing to comply with the United Nations embargo against Iraq, imposed 
in August 1990, greatly enhanced its effectiveness. See, e.g., Burns, Confrontation in the Gulf: 
Iraqis Threaten to Attack Saudis and Israelis if Nation is Strangled, N.V. Times, Sept. 24, 1990, at 
1, col. 6. 
160 The number of signatories required for entry into force of the Convention is likely 
to be sixty. Other provisions for entry into force include the U.S. position that all countries 
with cw capabilities must sign. See T. BERNAUER, supra note 7, at 201. 
161 See id. The problems with the informal export control regime imposed by the 
members of the Australia Group include: that it is possible to circumvent the regulations by 
arranging sales through third parties, that the regime is strictly voluntary and only twenty 
nations participate, and that many dual-purpose chemicals regulated by the Australia Group 
nations are produced in countries that do not regulate their trade. Because the Chemical 
Weapons Convention would affect the entire industry, the universal adoption of the ban 
could solve these problems. 
162 M. Turnipseed, supra note 152, at 2-3. 
163 Whether sanctions will be included in the Chemical Weapons Convention is still 
undetermined. A number of delegations favor the inclusion of sanctions in the treaty regime. 
United Nations Conference on Disarmament CD/952, at 225. 
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the proposed legislation discussed above. 164 Not only would these 
sanctions be multilateral, but they would also be mandatory.165 
Moreover, the treaty would make multilateral export controls 
legally binding. Even an expanded Australia Group, as proposed 
in the Conclusion, would most likely not include as many potential 
suppliers of cw precursors as would the Chemical Weapons Con-
vention. In contrast to the relatively small number of manufacturers 
of nuclear weapons materials, there are many manufacturers of a 
large number of the relevant chemicals-not just among Western 
nations, but throughout the industrialized and semi-industrialized 
world. 
VI. IMPROVING THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION 
Efforts to control the proliferation of bw have been minimal 
compared to those directed against the proliferation of cw, because 
the perceived threat is much less. Nevertheless, the Iraqi invasion 
of Kuwait again aroused suspicions that Iraq has not only a cw 
capability, but a bw capability as well. 166 The Third Review Confer-
ence of the Biological Weapons Convention, to be held in 1991, 
provides a timely opportunity to address some of the weaknesses of 
the Convention that could lead to increased proliferation of bw. 
In 1989, the Federation of American Scientists (F AS) estab-
lished a Working Group on Biological Weapons Verification to de-
velop recommendations to the Third Review Conference. The FAS 
group recommends that the Review Conference undertake actions 
to expand the authority of the United Nations Secretary-General. 
It would allow him to conduct inquiries into compliance concerns 
that do not involve use of bw but involve other violations of the 
Biological Weapons Convention, such as production. FAS also rec-
ommends that the Review Conference establish that parties to the 
164 Because the House bill (H.R. 3033) allows the President more discretion in imposing 
sanctions, there is greater potential that broader foreign policy or trade objectives might 
interfere with strong sanctions. 
165 Within a treaty regime, foreign policy or economic considerations would be far less 
likely to impinge on the decision whether to impose sanctions. These objectives clearly had 
an impact on the U.S. decision not to impose sanctions against Iraq on several occasions, 
including June 1990. "It would be the American farmer and the American exporter who 
would, in effect, be punished .... The Iraqis would be able to purchase the same kinds of 
goods and products elsewhere on the world market," said John Kelly, the Assistant Secretary 
of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. Krauss, Bush Aide Opposes Sanctions on 
Iraq, N.Y. Times, June 16, 1990, at 3, col. 1. 
166 Carus, Missiles in the Middle East: A New Threat to Stability, POLICY Focus, June 1989, 
at 5. 
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Biological Weapons Convention have the right to request that the 
Secretary-General make such an inquiry. Other recommendations 
of the group include: 1) that parties to the treaty ensure that bio-
logical laboratories in their countries abide by safety standards es-
tablished by the World Health Organization; 2) that the Review 
Conference augment the number of annual declarations parties 
make to build confidence in compliance to encompass permitted 
activities directly related to the Convention;l67 and 3) that the Re-
view Conference establish an ongoing committee to oversee the 
functioning of the treaty. 
In addition to strengthening confidence-building measures, the 
FAS Group proposes that the Third Review Conference undertake 
actions that will lead to a verification protocol to the Convention. l68 
Specific recommendations for a verification protocol include: re-
quirements to adhere to certain laboratory safety standards for 
infectious agents; annual declarations of many facilities and activi-
ties that are permitted under the treaty but may raise compliance 
concerns and procedures for the inspection of such "declared fa-
cilities;" and provisions for challenge inspections. l69 In conjunction 
with proposed actions to be taken at the Third Review Conference, 
one group of analysts recommends that the international commu-
nity establish an International Biological Monitoring Agency mod-
eled after the International Atomic Energy Agencyl70 to "increase 
the contribution of biology to peace, health and prosperity in the 
world" while making sure that the biological sciences would not be 
used "to serve offensive military purposes."l7l 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
Since World War I, confirmed instances of the use of cw and 
allegations of the use of bw have occurred exclusively in the Third 
World. Many Third World countries appear to be interested in 
adding these weapons to their arsenals. The ambiguous interna-
167 See supra note 58. 
168 Article V, Proposal A reads: "The Review Conference should call a series of meetings 
to draw up a draft proposal for a Protocol to the BWC on verification." Proposalsfor the Third 
Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, The Federation of American 
Scientists Expert Group on Biological Weapons Verification, Final Report, Sept. 1990. (copy 
on file at the Boston College Third World Law Journal office). 
169 Id. 
170 E. GEISSLER, supra note 4, at 153. 
171 Id. at 198 (Marcovich, "Annexe 6. Proposal for an International Biological Monitoring 
Agency"). 
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tional response to Iraq's use of cw in the Iran-Iraq War damaged 
the norm of non-use of cw and perhaps made the future use of 
these weapons, either by states or by state-sponsored terrorists, 
more likely. The Middle East may be particularly vulnerable to 
further use of cwo 
After nearly two decades, the negotiations leading toward a 
comprehensive ban on the possession of cw are showing real prom-
ise, yet the task of convincing Third World countries, particularly 
those in the Middle East, to become parties to the treaty may prove 
daunting. Meanwhile, the U.S. and many other countries are ex-
ploring unilateral and multilateral measures to address this threat, 
including export controls and sanctions. 
The best hope for stopping the flow of precursors to cw into 
the Middle East, and ultimately the production of cw, is a global 
ban on cw manufacture, export and use. In the interim, an ex-
panded and strengthened multilateral export control regime, based 
on the Australia Group, would serve a number of important objec-
tives. This export control regime should: 172 
-strive to include all nations with chemical manufacturing ca-
pabilities; 
-make use of the list of cw precursors developed by the Aus-
tralia Group;173 
-include mandatory sanctions against chemical companies that 
engage in trade of contraband chemicals; companies would thus 
be doubly deterred from such activities-not only by the laws 
imposed by their own government, but also by the threat of 
multilaterally imposed strictures on their pursuit of interna-
tional trade in other legal commodities; 
-require importing nations to supply proof that dual-purpose 
chemicals are to be used for permitted purposes; 
-gather and share existing economic intelligence about chem-
ical manufacturing capabilities all over the world. For example, 
the regime should make available information concerning na-
tions that possess phosphate rock, indicating which are capable 
of extracting elemental phosphorus on a large scale and which 
are on the verge of achieving such a capability;174 
172 A more comprehensive discussion of this proposal, and of the efficacy of export 
controls is contained in J. Stern, The Chemical Weapons Threat to International Security in 
the Middle East: United States Policy Alternatives (1989) (Center for Science and Interna-
tional Affairs, Harvard University). 
173 For a list of precursors that the Australia Group controls, see Thatcher, supra note 
140, at B 15. 
174 Elemental phosphorus, or alternatively phosphorus trichloride, is essential for the 
manufacture of several nerve agents. Phosphorus trichloride is on the Australia Group list. 
The effectiveness of controls on the export of phosphorus trichloride is highly dependent 
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-share intelligence about the particular chemicals that a given 
cw-producing nation would be seeking. 
81 
Such a regime, while far from perfect, would reduce the po-
tential payoff to companies contemplating export of chemicals for 
illicit purposes. While it is unlikely that all countries capable of 
manufacturing cw precursors would participate, the number of 
suppliers would nonetheless decrease, resulting in increased costs 
for importers. It will take all of these measures, and perhaps more, 
to ensure that these weapons will not playa role in international 
conflicts of the future. 
on whether the target nation has indigenous manufacturing capability of elemental phos-
phorus. because the element is extremely difficult to transport. For a discussion of the 
manufacture of elemental phosphorus. see CRC HANDBOOK OF CHEMISTRY AND PHYSICS 
B29-30 (62d ed. 1981). 
